

8. firmly insist on their positions, it is difficult to make concessions.

In turn, in the Republic of Belarus the negotiators believe that their foreign partners:

- tend to belittle them, consider their way of thinking and acting preferable;
- do not look at Belarusians as partners, do not give them enough authority and responsibility;
- very mercantile, focused only on the benefit;
- do not think about social goals.

Comparison of the features manifested in intercultural and «internal» negotiations reveals a number of similar features. For example, in enterprises, managers behave more like «foreigners», and the collective puts forward the same claims that are typical for Belarusian negotiators. A number of features turn out to be common for both sides. Indeed, the external political system is an extension of the internal and, apparently, reflects a number of cultural features.

Conclusion. Both our differences and the conflict often lead to impossibility of effective communication in negotiations, inability to understand what others think, feel and believe in, unwillingness to act with respect for the needs, opinions and rights of others. When this happens, people can think that they have no other option than to go to court or even aggressive actions against others. Therefore, in many cases, the help of an open-minded, neutral mediator who is able to look at the situation «from the outside» is helpful.

THE REPARATIONS PROBLEM IN GERMAN SETTLEMENT (1945–1949): BASIC APPROACHES IN ANGLO-AMERICAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

I. Kaviaka

Belarusian State Pedagogical University named after Maxim Tank,
Minsk, Belarus

The problem of German settlement takes a central place in the post-war international studies. The German question became one of the keys to the formation and collapse of bipolar system. In British and American historians' works the reparations problem is regarded as one of the main factors that led to German division after World War II.

The article aim is to define the main approaches in Anglo-American historiography to research of this problem.

Material and methods. Special publications of British and American research workers on the German problem in 1945 – 1949 served as the main sources to this article. The research is based on the principles of historicism,

objectiveness and value approach. Both general scientific and special historical methods are used.

Results and their discussion. During the research, three main approaches to the analysis of the reparation problem in the context of the German settlement in 1945–1949 were established. Representatives of the “*containment school*” in Anglo-American historiography proceed from the fact that in 1945–1949 the German policy of the USSR was based on a long-term plan. They are inclined to view Moscow's tough reparation policy as part of a plan to destabilize the economic and political situation in Germany with the aim of establishing Soviet control over the whole of it. As a result, the economic policy of the USSR, conducted in Germany, deepened the split between the eastern and western parts of the country and forced the three Western powers to take a course toward the creation of a separate West German government. Thus, disagreements over the issue of reparations predetermined the breakdown of the system of quadripartite control [1, p. 286; 3, p. 425–426; 10, p. 205; 11, p. 119; 13, p. 18].

Representatives of *the liberal trend* in Anglo-American historiography note that in the postwar years the USSR had the right to carry out a rigid reparation policy in Germany. Western countries, primarily the United States, could provide financial support to the USSR after World War II and soften the Soviet position on the issue of reparations, but did not do so. In January 1945, the United States refused to grant the USSR a loan of \$ 6 million to restore the Soviet economy. This was of key importance for Soviet-American relations in the post-war period and influenced strongly the policy of the USSR in Germany. In conditions when aid from the Allies did not arrive, it became necessary to take it from the defeated enemy. At that time the USSR could not afford to be magnanimous and generous. The huge losses of the USSR during World War II forced the Soviet side to carry out large-scale seizures of reparations in its zone of occupation. As a result, the agreement on reparations was never reached and the joint control system in Germany collapsed [2, p. 13; 7, p. 595]. The authors note that the evolution of Soviet thinking about the future of Germany did not initially follow a certain trajectory. When the war ended, the USSR did not have a ready answer to the German question. In 1945–1949 years, when carrying out occupation measures in the Soviet zone, economic goals were higher than political ones. From a narrow economic point of view, Soviet reparations are assessed as a great success and an essential component of the internal reconstruction of the USSR [8, p. 10; 9, p. 307].

The third direction in Anglo-American historiography – *rationalistic* – analyzes the problem of reparations as a consequence of the incompatibility of the objective interests of the great powers and the result of the inconsistency of the regulatory framework of the German settlement. The authors note that the agreements of Yalta and Potsdam on the German problem contained a lot of uncertainty. The agreement to treat Germany as a single economic entity and the

agreement on reparations contradicted each other. Consequently, the issue of reparations was originally a dividing factor. Reparation agreements have increased the independence of individual zones and contributed to the economic disintegration of Germany. Not being a single economic entity, it could not be politically united. Each side was right in its own way. The USSR had strong reasons for demanding reparations from Germany, which devastated their country. The West did not understand why it should pay and feed the western zones [4, p. 201; 5, p. 92; 6, p. 121; 12, p. 31].

Conclusion. As a result of the study, three main approaches to the analysis of the reparations problem were identified in Anglo-American historiography. Approaches are presented by the “containment school”, rationalistic and liberal historiographical directions.

Reference list:

1. Botting, D. From the ruins of the Reich. Germany 1945–1949 / Douglas Botting. – New York: Crown Publishers, 1985. – 341 p.
2. Childs, D. The GDR: Moscow’s German ally / David Childs. – London: Allen&Unwinn, 1983. – 346 p.
3. Dulles, A.W. Alternatives for Germany / Allen W. Dulles // Foreign Affairs. – 1947. – Vol. 25. – № 3. – P. 421–432.
4. Fulbrook, M. A history of Germany, 1918–2008. The divided nation / Mary Fulbrook. – Oxford: Willey-Blackwell, 2009. – 737 p.
5. Fulbrook, M. Interpretations of the two Germanies, 1945–1990 / Mary Fulbrook. – London: Macmillan, 2000. – 114 p.
6. Judt, T. Postwar. A history of Europe since 1945 / Tony Judt. – New York: Penguin Press, 2005. – 967 p.
7. Mosely, P. The occupation of Germany. New light on how the zones were drawn / Philip Mosely // Foreign Affairs. – 1950. – Vol. 28. – № 4. – P. 580–604.
8. Naimark, N. The Russians in Germany. A history of the Soviet zone of occupation, 1945–1949 / Norman M. Naimark. – Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University, 1996. – 586 p.
9. Nettle, P. German reparations in the Soviet zone / Peter Nettle // Foreign Affairs – 1951. – Vol. 29. – № 2. – P. 300–307.
10. Rearden, S. The dilemmas of dual containment. Germany as a security problem, 1945–1950 / Steven Rearden // The United States and Germany in the era of the cold war, 1945–1990. – Vol. 1: 1945–1968 / Ed. by D. Junker. – Washington: German Historical Institute, 2004. – P. 204–208.
11. Slusser, R. Soviet policy and the division of Germany, 1941–1945 / Robert M. Slusser // The impact of World War II on the Soviet Union / Ed. by S.J. Linz. – Irvine: Rowman&Allanheld, 1985. – P. 107–125.
12. Turner, H.A. Germany from partition to unification / Henry Ashby Turner Jr. – New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992. – 269 p.
13. Woodhouse, C.M. British foreign policy since the Second World War / C.M. Woodhouse. – New York: Praeger, 1962. – 255 p.