

М. Дебре в своих мемуарах охарактеризовал Францию в период Четвёртой республики следующим образом: «Французы работают, накапливают, вкладывают. Они хотят смотреть с надеждой в будущее. И вот в такой Франции ведётся посредственная, разочаровывающая и даже постыдная политика, совершенно не способная отвечать за судьбу Нации. Повсюду, в любой области она подводит нас к страшным испытаниям. И во время этого нашего ослабления Германия поднимается и вызывает к себе уважение, а англо-саксонский мир просто смеётся над нами и презирает нас» [2, с. 52].

Таким образом, с одной стороны, РПФ являлась проводником европейского пути решения германского вопроса, а с другой стороны, она опасалась быстрых темпов реализации германской политики. Это в конечном итоге привело к тому, что вся деятельность РПФ была направлена на создание разного рода препятствий в разрешении германской проблемы.

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**TRUMAN'S DOCTRINE AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR
STRENGTHENING DIPLOMATIC INFLUENCE AND CONTROL
IN WESTERN EUROPE AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE
MODEL OF EUROCENTRICITY IN THE WORLD IN 1947**

Uliya Podriez (Sumy)

The confrontation between the two world powers, the US and the USSR, created a new geopolitical paradigm in the international arena that gradually grew into the Cold War.

Currently, the United States and the Russian Federation have the largest rocket-nuclear capabilities, so relations between the two countries remain key in

world politics. The interest in the problem of US-Soviet relations manifests itself to the extent that the key to an understanding of contemporary US-Russian relations and the political tension that is observed today in society is precisely in the Soviet period. If you look closely at the relationship between the US and Russia in retrospect, then it becomes clear that these states are still actively fighting for world leadership.

In 1946–1947, the Western European direction became the main priority of American foreign policy. By betting on Western Europe, the creators of American foreign policy did not make mistakes in their calculations. Without the inclusion of this vital region for the United States in its sphere of influence, it would be impossible for Washington to achieve leadership, as the Eurasian space sharply limited American influence in the world and the control over the course of events, as well as access to the richest natural resources of this supercontinent. However, the path to achieving Washington's global leadership was blocking by the USSR, whose consolidation in Western Europe would "cause irreparable harm to the United States". Therefore, protection from Soviet domination has become an important task for the United States. The realization of this goal has led to the Cold War [2, c. 99].

In February 1947, the President of the USA Truman launched a specific program of measures to save Europe from Soviet expansion. On March 12, 1947 in the presidential message of the congress on the allocation of 400 million dollars in order to help Greece and Turkey, known as the "Truman Doctrine", it has already been formally spoken about the threat of "totalitarian" regimes that hang over the "free world". Recognizing that he is proposing to interfere in the internal affairs of others who are far from America, and that the course he recommends to take is very serious, Truman tried to explain his policy to the fact that the United States should intervene in the lives of other people in order to help the majority. Declaring that "the world is not in place and that the status quo is not inviolable", Truman has made it clear that the United States would only agree with such changes in the world that they consider to be correct. If, he said further, the United States will refuse "to assist Greece and Turkey in this fatal time, then it will have far-reaching consequences for the West, as well as for the East" [4, c. 173].

The "Truman doctrine" included the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), which was formed in 1949. The new policy was expressed in economic, financial and military assistance to non-communist regimes. Despite the preparatory work, Truman's doctrine met a strong opposition in Congress.

Truman's doctrine made it possible that the congress imposed unilateral commitments on the United States, without providing itself with either allies or with the support of the United Nations. In accordance with this doctrine, Truman's government, in particular, took up military aid to France in its colonial war in Indochina, which ultimately led to the Vietnam War.

In Greece and Turkey, Washington pursued military-strategic goals, including strengthening the positions oil monopolies of the USA in the Middle East. But in the general terms of the Cold War, the “Truman Doctrine” represented only a preliminary, preparatory operation. Washington then considered Western Europe as the main field of action in this war [10, c. 42].

The US government has offered the Soviet Union and other European countries to take part in the plan for the reconstruction and restoration of Europe, but under the pressure of the USSR, other eastern European states have abandoned the American position [12, c. 80].

The justification by the president of the need for active American intervention in European affairs was seen in the USSR as evidence of the ultimate US refusal to pursue isolationism and their intentions to assume the role of world leader.

One of the official British officials in 1947 informed D. Acheson that “the difficult economic crisis in the UK removes the responsibility of maintaining political and economic stability in Greece and Turkey” – the traditional “zones of responsibility” of London. On February 21, 1947, the United States received two British notes, which reported on the consent of Britain to convey to the Americans functions to assist Greece and Turkey. The British side also announced the withdrawal of its troops from Greece. In this regard, J. Marshall said: “Obviously, the British refused their presence in the Middle East and appealed to the United States as their successor” [7, c. 152]. In fact, this was the actual transfer of powers to the United States owing to the weakening of the UK’s position on the international scene, but most importantly, it was a signal in response to which the Americans proclaimed Truman’s doctrine.

Former US Department of State Jones noted that the notes were regarded as evidence that Britain “passed the US leadership to the world with all its difficulties and glory” [6, p. 43].

In this regard, on February 27 and on March 10, 1947 at the White House, Harry Truman, D. Marshall and D. Acheson met with congressmen to convince them of the need to help Greece and Turkey. In his speech, D. Marshall highlighted the protection of American interests. However, the approach provided a decisive influence. D. Acheson, who said that “the United States to take measures to strengthen countries threatened by Soviet aggression equivalent protection of freedom itself” [8, p. 87].

At the same time D. Acheson openly talked about the intention of the USSR to take a dominant position in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, and thus penetrate into South Asia and Africa. Taking into account the fact that the statements of D. Marshall about the need to preserve and maintain political stability in the region, US access to raw materials and new markets did not make a congress of proper influence, D. Acheson in his speech stated in an attempt to achieve communism’s dominant position on the continent and its further quest for world domination.

Acheson's performance was quite successful and, as it turned out, was effective. He thus described the situation: "Just as apples in the barrel are spoiled in the presence of at least one rotten, the situation in Greece and Turkey will affect Iran and change the whole course of events in the Middle East, in Africa, Italy, France and etc., we and only we have the opportunity to reflect the attacks of the USSR on the achievement of hegemony around the world".

Acheson believed that in Turkey, the USSR intended to station its naval bases and then its independence, and after that, the independence of Greece and Iran would have been lost. Acheson also said that in the case "if at least one of these states falls into the sphere of influence of the USSR or in Italy will come to power communists, the fate of the world will be determined" [1, p. 153].

The proclamation of Truman's doctrine was mainly due to factors of geopolitical character. Greece and Turkey, a kind of key to Western Europe, attached particular importance to Washington's strategy. This is due to the fact that both countries are located at the junction of Europe and Asia. Therefore, the American administration was guided primarily by the fact that Turkey has the Dardanelles, the "gate" to the shores of the USSR, Romania and Bulgaria, and is located between them and the richest energy resources in the Middle East.

Turkey was assigned the role of a geostrategic bridgehead of the United States to establish influence in the region. In the 1947 Act of Assistance to Greece and Turkey, it was noted that "the territorial integrity and survival of these states are of particular importance for the security of the United States", as "if Greece falls under the control of an armed minority, the consequences for Turkey will be serious. In this case, confusion and mess spreads across the entire Middle East" [11, c. 199].

For ideological reasons, the USSR ambassador to the United States M. Novikov wrote in connection with this that such a policy "gave its European countries a straightforward choice – either from the US against the USSR or from the USSR against the US and identified the split of the continent". According to one of the White House advisers, Truman's doctrine was "the first gun in a campaign designed to make people realize that the war is not over".

The proclamation of Truman's doctrine was perceived by both politicians and the public in the US ambiguously. Critics of the doctrine in American political circles have said that the costs of its implementation will be much higher than the end result. It was emphasized that "the doctrine will create a precedent for interference in the internal affairs of other states and may lead to a war with the USSR, as well as significantly weaken the United Nations" [13, c. 88].

It is also worth noting that the USSR Consulate in New York Y. Lomakin telegraphed to Moscow after the proclamation of Truman's doctrine: "Truman's speech aroused a serious wave of dissatisfaction among the population", which was feared by the war between the USSR and the United States. However, already in the second half of 1947, according to public opinion polls, 54% of American respondents supported the US actions against Turkey and Greece, and

40% were ready (albeit through the UN) to “declare war on the USSR if it would continue to threaten Greece” [5, с. 492].

The leadership of the USSR was concerned not with the unification of the efforts of all countries affected by the war for the speedy recovery of the world economy, but by the creation of its own, independent of the political and economic sphere, centered on the Soviet Union, surrounded by satellites. The economy of these countries in the immediate postwar years was increasingly subject to the Soviet economy with the tendency of transformation into its appendage.

Another source of restoration and strengthening of the economic power of the USSR was to serve as a reparation, as well as industrial equipment, which was exported by the Soviet Union as a military prey. It is the tough policy of the Stalinist leadership, aimed at strengthening the positions of the USSR and its allies, which became the cause of the collision of the superpowers.

Both states sought to consolidate themselves as an independent center of power in the most important geostrategic region of the world, filling the vacuum created by it in power, and constructing a new political and economic order. It definitively defined the contours of international relations for the next decades.

Consequently, the weakening of the traditional centers of power in the European part of the continent against the backdrop of the phenomenal power of the United States and the collapse of the Eurocentric world has given Washington the opportunity to independently determine the world economic (and, consequently, political) development, relying thus on economic power as the main instrument of diplomacy. Regarding the USSR, Washington’s global strategy has become a form of economic, financial and, subsequently, military assistance to non-communist regimes. Therefore, in 1947, the realization of Washington’s economic diplomacy began as an integral part of the US global strategy to counteract the apparent aggression of the USSR.

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ФОРМИРОВАНИЕ ВЗГЛЯДОВ ДЖ. КЕННЕДИ НА ПРОБЛЕМЫ «ТРЕТЬЕГО МИРА» (1950-е гг.)

С.Ю. Шенин (Саратов)

На раннем этапе политической карьеры Джона Ф. Кеннеди его взгляды на американскую внешнюю политику формировались под влиянием первого личного опыта пребывания за границей. В 1930-е гг., когда его отец, Джозеф, на пике своей политической карьеры добился назначения на должность посла в Великобритании, Джон жил в Англии, посещал Советский Союз и Германию. Во всяком случае, тему своей дипломной работы в Гарвардском университете («Умиротворение в Мюнхене») Кеннеди выбрал под впечатлением именно от этих поездок [3].

Уже в 1946 г. Джон Кеннеди уверенно выиграл первые выборы в нижнюю палату Конгресса в 11-ом округе своего родного города Бостона, получив 71,9% голосов. Правда, многие исследователи относят эту победу на счет внушительного капитала и прочных связей его отца с руководством ячейки демократической партии в Новой Англии.

В первые годы работы в американском Конгрессе Кеннеди поддерживал внешнеполитический курс Г. Трумэна, голосуя за большинство правительственных инициатив. Однако при этом по целому ряду вопросов он жестко критиковал политику демократической администрации. В частности, во внешнеэкономической политике он выступал против закона о расширении торговых соглашений, поддерживал сокращение помощи Европе и, наконец, голосовал против программы помощи слаборазвитым странам – «пункта-4» [8, p. 58].

Осенью 1951 г. Кеннеди совершил поездку, коренным образом изменившую его взгляды на внешний мир. Вместе с братом Робертом и сестрой Патрицией он посетил Израиль, Пакистан, Индию, Индокитай, Малайю и Корею.